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JURISDICTION OVER APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)U). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
A. Did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation {"Tribe") is a necessary and indispensable 
party under Utah R. Civ. P. 19? "Ordinarily, a trial court's determination properly 
entered under Rule 19 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Seftel v. 
Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), ajf'd sub nom. Landes v. 
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted); Turville v. J. & J 
Props., L.C., 2006 UT App 305,124, 145 P.3d 1146, 1150. 
B. When the Tribe seeks to regulate business activities occurring solely on the 
Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation ("Reservation"), is there a need for the court to 
balance the equities of the State and the Tribe? Because this is a question of law, a 
"correctness standard" applies. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P .2d 
194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
C. Was the district court correct to grant a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims against the Defendants-Appellees Dino Ray 
Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, and Sheila Wopsock in their individual capacities (the 
"Individual Defendants") and LaRose Construction Company, Inc. and D. Ray C. 
Enterprises, L.L.C., (the "Company Defendants"), including claims for (1) "extortion," 
1 
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(2) "blacklisting" in violation of article XII, section 19 and article XVI, section 4 of the 
Utah Constitution, (3) unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the Utah Antitrust Act 
and article XII, section 20 of the Utah Constitution, (4) civil conspiracy, and (5) tortious 
interference with economic relations? Because "the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question oflaw," the district court's ruling is reviewed under a "correctness standard." 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d at 196. 
D. Assuming Plaintiffs-Appellants have adequately briefed the issue, which 
they did not, did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(d) motion for supplemental pleadings? "A motion to amend under 
Rule 15(d) is addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court .... " Sw. Nurseries, 
LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition by District 
Court 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed this action on April 5, 2013 in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court, Duchesne County, State of Utah, Civil No. 13000009. (R. 1-21.) The 
original Complaint sought declaratory relief with respect to the Tribe's exercise of 
authority and asserted claims for tortious interference with economic relations and 
extortion against the Individual Defendants. (Id.) On May 1, 2013, defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss the Complaint. On July 17, 2013, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a motion 
for leave to file an amended complaint. (R. 431-35.) 
2 
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On July 22, 2013, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. The court 
asked for additional briefing on the issue of whether the Tribe made a general appearance 
·in the case. (R. 477.) 
On September 4, 2013, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed the Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief and Damages ("Amended Complaint"). (R. 548-
79 .) On September 20, 2013, the Tribe filed a notice of removal to the United States 
District Court, District of Utah. (R. 629-31.) The case was later remanded, and a motion 
to stay proceedings was filed by certain defendants on August 24, 2014. (R. 648-55, 738-
48.) An order staying the case was entered on October 9, 2014. (R. 895-900.) The stay 
was lifted on October 20, 2015. (R. 1141.) 
On October 7, 2015, the Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants filed 
their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (R. 198-200.) A hearing was scheduled 
on the motion, as well as the motions to dismiss filed by all other parties, for January 29, 
2016. The parties presented oral argument on that date. (R. 1947.) After oral argument, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading. (R. 1469-
73.) 
On March 28, 2016, the district court entered four written rulings dismissing all of 
the claims in the case and denying the motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading. 
(R. 17 57-93.) On May 12, 2016, the district court entered its judgment dismissing all of 
the claims in the action. (R. 2041-75.) 
3 
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B. Statement of Facts 
The key fact alleged in the Amended Complaint is that on March 20, 2013, the Ute 
Tribal Employment Rights Office ("UTERO") issued a letter (the "March 20 Letter"), 
addressed to all oil and gas companies, signed by Sheila Wopsock in her capacity as 
UTERO Director. (R. 53; a copy of the letter is attached to the Addendum as 
Exhibit "A.") The March 20 Letter states that the Tribal Energy and Minerals 
Department had "revoked the access permits" for "Rocks Off, Inc.-Ryan Harvey," among 
other entities. The March 20 Letter further states that, based on the Tribal Energy and 
Minerals Department's actions, the UTERO Commission had revoked the UTERO 
license for the listed businesses, including Rocks Off, Inc., pursuant to a Tribal law called 
the UTERO Ordinance, Ord. No. 10-002 (July 27, 2010). The March 20 Letter states 
that, as 
(Id.) 
a result of such action, these businesses and individuals are no 
longer authorized to perform work on the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation. Any use of these businesses and individuals by 
an employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of 
this Notice may result in the assessment of penalties and/or 
sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the 
law. 1 
In their appeal brief of September 28, 2016 ("Appeal Brief'), Plaintiffs-Appellants 
do not accurately describe the contents of the March 20 Letter. For instance, Plaintiffs-
1 While claiming to provide this Court with the relevant portion of the March 20 Letter, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants omitted the first sentence of the above quote, which provides key 
context regarding the scope of the UTERO directive. (Brief of PL-App. at 31-32.) 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellants make the broad assertion that, on "March 20, 2015 [sic], Wopsock demanded 
that all oil and gas companies cease doing business with Plaintiffs." (Brief of PL-App. 
at 12.) They further argue that the demands "were not limited to Ute tribal lands." (Id.) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' characterizations go well beyond the actual contents of the 
March 20 Letter, which makes no reference to Plaintiffs-Appellants' activities off of 
Tribal lands. Also, citing page 562 of the record (which is page 15 of the Amended 
Complaint), Plaintiffs-Appellants state that all "acts and occurrences complained of in the 
Amended Complaint occurred on fee land outside of Ute tribal land." (Id. at 14.) This 
language, however, does not appear at the cited portion of the Amended Complaint. 
Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges that the "unlawful and unauthorized conduct has 
caused and continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm to non-Indian Plaintiffs' 
business activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country or reservation." (Id. at 
44.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The district court correctly held that the Tribe is a necessary and 
indispensable party in this proceeding. The majority of the Prayers for Relief in the 
Amended Complaint ask the court to take action against the Tribe, and according to the 
facts in the Amended Complaint, all of the actions by the Individual Defendants that 
allegedly harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants occurred on Ute Tribal lands. 
2. The questions of whether the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires and 
beyond the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction are questions of law, not questions of fact, 
5 
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and as such, the court does not assume these legal conclusions to be true for purposes of a 
Motion to Dismiss. Further, questions of whether the Individual Defendants acted ultra 
vires (i.e., in violation of the UTERO Ordinance) and beyond the scope of the Tribe's 
jurisdiction require an interpretation of Tribal law; therefore these questions are outside 
the jurisdiction of the Utah state courts and would properly be heard by the Ute Tribal 
Court. 
3. A balancing of the interests of the State and the Tribe is not necessary in 
this case because the Tribe is not attempting to regulate off-Reservation business 
activities. Indeed, the Amended Complaint fails to allege a single business activity that 
the Tribe or the Individual Defendants sought to regulate on non-Tribal land. The only 
action the Individual Defendants took was to exercise authority over companies engaged 
in business activities on Tribal lands, which is squarely within the Tribe's jurisdiction and 
does not require a balancing of equities. 
4. The district court correctly dismissed the claims against the Individual 
Defendants because the Tribe's sovereign immunity bars the suit. Plaintiffs-Appellants 
have not identified a single provision of the UTERO Ordinance that they believe the 
Individual Defendants exceeded or violated, and in any event, only the Ute Tribal Court 
can interpret the UTERO Ordinance and make an ultra vires determination. The Tribe is 
the real party in interest with respect to questions of the scope of authority that the Tribe 
is capable of bestowing on Tribal officials; yet the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable 
6 
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party that cannot be joined in this action, and the Ute Tribal Court has initial jurisdiction 
over this question. 
5. The district court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs-Appellants' tort claims 
because they are not supported by.the facts in the record, and some of the alleged tort 
claims do not even exist under Utah law. 
6. The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Company 
Defendants because the Amended Complaint fails to set out any facts supporting the 
claims made against the Company Defendants. 
7. The district court properly denied Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion for leave to 
file a supplemental pleading. 
ARGUMENT 
By and through counsel, the Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants 
respectfully urge this Court to uphold the decision of the district court in this proceeding, 
including the district court's holdings: (1) that the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable 
party that has not been joined, (2) that the Individual Defendants are immune from suit 
based on the Tribe's sovereign immunity, (3) that the Amended Complaint fails to allege 
the necessary facts supporting the claims made against the Company Defendants, and 
(4) dismissing all of Plaintiffs-Appellants' tort claims. As set out below, the district court ·'-
correctly found that, because all of the actions by the Individual Defendants that allegedly 
harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants took place on Ute Tribal lands and were actions by an 
7 
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agency of the Ute Tribal government (i.e., the UTERO), this case belongs in Ute Tribal 
Court. 
In addition, certain of the arguments in Plaintiffs-Appellants' Appeal Brief rely on 
the assertion of facts which do not appear in their Amended Complaint, such that they 
may not be relied upon in this Appeal. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TRIBE 
IS A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY THAT HAS NOT 
BEEN JOINED. 
In their Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the Tribe is not a necessary 
and indispensable party in this proceeding. (Brief of PL-App. at 19-28.) They claim that 
the real focus of Plaintiffs-Appellants' case is the alleged actions of the individual Tribal 
officials named as Defendants, and that the Tribe would really not be affected by a 
decision against those Tribal officials because their alleged actions were ultra vires (i.e., 
beyond the scope of the UTERO Ordinance) and beyond the scope of authority that the 
Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. (Id. at 23, 27-28.) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' position on appeal is defeated by the contents of the 
Amended Complaint and by relevant case law. First, their assertion that the Tribe, 
contrary to t~e holding below, does not have a critical interest in this proceeding, is 
undercut by the fact that 11 of the 18 Prayers for Relief in the Amended Complaint ask 
the court to take action against the Tribe. Second, according to the facts in the Amended 
Complaint, all of the actions by the Individual Defendants that allegedly harmed 
Plaintiffs-Appellants occurred on the Reservation; Plaintiffs-Appellants assert for the first 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time in the Appeal Brief that the Individual Defendants took actions off of the 
Reservation that harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants. Third, Plaintiffs-Appellants conflate facts 
with legal conclusions; the questions of whether the Individual Defendants acted ultra 
vires and beyond the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction are questions oflaw, not questions 
of fact. As such, contrary to Plaintiffs-Appellants' assertion, the court does not assume 
these legal conclusions to be true for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Because these 
questions have not been ruled on by a court, Plaintiffs-Appellants cannot properly make 
the arguments in their Appeal Brief which assume as a "given" that the Individual 
Defendants acted ultra vires or exceeded the jurisdiction of the Tribe. Finally, Plaintiffs-
Appellants fail to rebut the district court's holding, based on unbroken U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, that only the Ute Tribal Court may hear matters that require 
interpretation of Ute Tribal law, such as the determination of whether the Individual 
Defendants acted ultra vires in violation of the UTERO Ordinance. 
A. Background Regarding the Tribe, UTERO, and OTERO Ordinance 
The Ute Business Council, the legislative body of the Tribe, enacted the UTERO 
Ordinance, which established the UTERO. The UTERO Ordinance sets out the terms 
and conditions upon which an employer may work on the Reservation, including 
conditions regarding its selection of employees, subcontractors, and suppliers. (R. 1076.) 
The Tribe enacted the UTERO Ordinance in order to promote utilization of Indian 
workers, subcontractors, and suppliers, and to ensure that anyone doing business on the 
Reservation complies with the Tribe's laws. One mechanism for enforcing these 
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requirements is to require all companies doing business on the Reservation - whether as 
contractors, subcontractors, or suppliers - to obtain a business license from the UTERO. 
(Id.) The UTERO Ordinance requires that all decisions by the UTERO regarding an 
entity's compliance with the Ordinance must be made or approved by the three-member 
UTERO Commission, a quasi-judicial body created by the Ordinance, with a right of 
appeal to the Ute Tribal Courts. (R. 1111-15.) No person or company is required to do 
business on Tribal lands, but if they choose to do so, they are required to comply with 
Tribal law, including the UTERO's regulations. 
As discussed supra, on March 13, 2013, the Tribal Energy and Minerals 
Department revoked the access permit of Rocks Off, Inc.-Ryan Harvey, and as a result, 
the UTERO Commission revoked Rocks Off, Inc.' s UTERO business licensee. Although • 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' facilities are located off of the Reservation, they were supplying 
gravel and equipment for work that was being done on the Reservation by companies 
such as Newfield Production Company, Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc., Newfield RMI, 
LLC, and Newfield Drilling Services, Inc. ( collectively, "Newfield Defendants"). As 
such, the UTERO sent the March 20 Letter to the Newfield Defendants and other oil and 
gas companies doing business on the Reservation to inform them of the revocation. 
The March 20 Letter states that it was issued by the UTERO pursuant to the 
UTERO Ordinance. The UTERO Ordinance derives from the Tribe's authority to set 
terms and conditions for businesses working on the Reservation, including terms and 
conditions related to the selection of subcontractors and suppliers. 
10 
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The March 20 Letter makes no mention of any activities or business dealings of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants occurring off of the Reservation. Thus, what occurred in the present 
case is that the Tribe, by adopting the UTERO Ordinance, has exercised its sovereign 
authority to determine who may do business within its jurisdiction and on what terms. 
While Newfield is not required to work on the Reservation, if it chooses to do so, it must 
comply with the Tribe's laws, including the requirement that it use only suppliers and 
subcontractors licensed by the UTERO. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants are unhappy with the actions by the UTERO Commission 
that are set out in the March 20 Letter, but rather than challenging those actions by using 
the procedures provided for in the UTERO Ordinance - i.e., an appeal to the Ute Tribal 
Court- Plaintiffs-Appellants are seeking to circumvent those procedures by claiming that 
the governmental actions by the Tribal officials involved, in their official and individual 
capacities, constitute torts in the State of Utah. There is simply no precedent for using 
tort actions in one jurisdiction to collaterally challenge official actions by governmental 
officials in another jurisdiction. 
Further, while Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that the March 20 Letter was the cause 
of the harm they suffered and that the situs of the harm they suffered was off-Reservation 
and in the State of Utah, the Amended Complaint does not contain a single allegation that 
the Tribe, the UTERO, or the Individual Defendants sought to or did exercise any 
authority off of the Reservation, sought to interfere with Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-
Reservation business activities, or imposed a boycott on Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-
11 
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Reservation activities. The Amended Complaint fails to provide any allegation that the 
Individual Defendants told companies subject to the UTERO's jurisdiction to stop doing 
business with Plaintiffs-Appellants off of the Reservation. Nor does it contain any 
examples of off-Reservation business opportunities that Plaintiffs-Appellants lost because 
of the March 20 Letter or actions by the Individual Defendants. As indicated supra, the 
March 20 Letter makes no reference to off-Reservation activities. 
B. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Argument that the Tribe Is Not a Necessary and 
Indispensable Party Is Flawed for Multiple Reasons. 
The district court held that what is at stake in this case is the exercise of tribal 
authority by the Ute Tribe over business activities within the Reservation, such that the 
Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party. (R. 1772, 1776.) In their Appeal Brief, 
making arguments that have no basis in the case law or the facts set out in the Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that the Tribe did not have a significant interest in 
the actions by the Individual Defendants because the Individual Defendants were 
allegedly acting ultra vires (i.e., in violation of the UTERO Ordinance) and beyond the 
scope of the jurisdiction that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. 
This argument fails for three reasons. First, it relies on Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
mistaken impression that the court must accept as true for purposes of the Motion to 
Dismiss and this Appeal the so-called "facts" that the Individual Defendants acted ultra 
vires and beyond the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction, whereas in actuality these are not 
facts but rather are legal questions that no court has yet ruled upon, and are not to be 
deemed to be true for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Second, as the district court 
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found, only the Ute Tribal Court has jurisdiction to interpret Ute Tribal law for purposes 
determining whether certain actions were ultra vires and for making an initial 
determination as to the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction. Third, even if this Court could 
rule on those issues, the facts that Plaintiffs-Appellants allege in their Appeal Brief, 
which they claim show that the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires and beyond the 
scope of the Tribe's authority (particularly that the Individual Defendants interfered with 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' business opportunities outside of Tribal lands), do not appear 
anywhere in the Amended Complaint, such that these alleged facts set forth in the Appeal 
Brief are not properly before this Court. 
The following sections of this brief apply these three points separately to the claim 
that the Individual Defendants exceeded the scope of the Tribe's authority and to the 
claim that they acted ultra vires. While there are many similarities between these two 
issues, there are also important differences that justify discussing them separately. 
1. The Scope of the Authority that the Tribe Is Capable of 
Bestowing on Its Officials 
i. Whether the Individual Def end ants Exceeded the 
Authority that the Tribe Is Capable of Bestowing on 
Them Is a Legal Question that No Court Has Ruled On, 
Not a Fact 
Plaintiffs-Appellants take it as a fact that the Individual Defendants exceeded the 
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them: "[f]or purposes of 
the motion before the trial court, the facts that the officials acted outside the scope of the 
jurisdiction of the Ute Tribe must be assumed true." (Brief of PL-App. at 21.) This 
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position is presumably based on a misreading of the principle that in a motion to dismiss, 
all of the facts in the complaint are assumed to be true. However, a determination that 
someone has exceeded the jurisdiction of a government is not a fact, it is a legal 
conclusion. No court has found that the Individual Defendants exceeded the authority 
that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them, so Plaintiffs-Appellants may not, as they 
have, premise their argument on this issue. If in the future a court does evaluate the 
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on the UTERO officials, the 
Tribe clearly will be a necessary and indispensable party in that proceeding, because 
decisions about the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction go to the very heart of its 
sovereignty. 
ii. The Tribal Court Has the First Right to Rule on the Scope 
of the Tribe's Jurisdiction. 
Under well-established U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the forum that has the 
initial authority to rule on the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction is the Ute Tribal Court. 
(R. 1079-80.) See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[T]he federal 
policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to 
give the tribal court a 'full opportunity to de~ermine its own jurisdiction."') ( quoting Nat' l 
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)). See also 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,453 (1997) ("As to nonmembers, we hold, a 
tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."). Thus, even 
if Plaintiffs-Appellants had properly framed the issue as a legal question and asked the 
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district court to rule on it, the district court would have lacked authority to do so until the 
Tribal Court had issued a determination. 
iii. Plaintiffs-Appellants Rely on Alleged Facts Not Contained 
in Their Amended Complaint. 
Assuming arguendo that the district court had the authority to consider this issue, 
the alleged facts that Plaintiffs-Appellants set out in their Appeal Brief in support of their 
assertion that the Individual Defendants exceeded the scope of the Tribe's authority do 
not appear in their Amended Complaint, such that they are not properly before the court. 
At the heart of Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the Individual Defendants 
exceeded the scope of the Tribe's authority (as well as their argument that the state courts 
have an interest in this case) are the repeated representations in their Appeal Brief that the 
Individual Defendants demanded that Newfield and other companies subject to the 
Tribe's jurisdiction cease doing business with Plaintiffs-Appellants outside of Tribal 
lands. See, e.g., Brief of PL-App. at 20 ("the directives are not limited to a prohibition 
against use of Plaintiffs' Products on tribal ground") ( emphasis in original); id. at 3 5 
("The tribal officials [sic] demand was not limited to Ute Tribal land but a general 
boycott of Plaintiffs' businesses.") 
The problem with this assertion is that the Amended Complaint does not contain a 
single allegation that the Tribe, the UTERO, or its officials sought to or did interfere with 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-Reservation business dealings or imposed a boycott on 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-Reservation activities. Nor does it contain any examples of off-
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Reservation business opportunities that Plaintiffs-Appellants lost because of the 
March 20 Letter (which is not surprising, given that the Letter does not refer to off-
Reservation activities) or other actions by the Individual Defendants. The Amended 
Complaint merely alleges that Plaintiffs-Appellants' businesses, which are located off the 
Reservation, were hurt by the March 20 Letter; however, the location of their business 
offices is not an "activity," nor does it describe an action taken by the UTERO officials 
that caused a lost business opportunity off of the Reservation. 
Rather, the allegations in the Amended Complaint regarding the harm to Plaintiffs-
Appellants' business dealings are limited to actions that the Individual Defendants 
allegedly took on Tribal land. As the district court found (in the context of evaluating 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' tort claims): 
The facts set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint establish, 
at most, that Newfield was notified by UTERO that Rocks Offs access 
permit had been revoked and were no longer authorized to conduct work on 
tribal land, and that Newfield followed that directive by no longer utilizing 
Rocks Off for work on tribal land. 
(R. 1778.) 
Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the Tribe is not a necessary and indispensable 
party because the Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of the Tribe's authority 
fails because it relies on factual allegations that do ·not appear in the Amended Complaint. 
Put another way - in a motion to dismiss, the alleged facts in a complaint are presumed to 
be true, but the party opposing that motion is bound by those facts and may not create 
new ones later for use in its legal arguments. All of Plaintiffs-Appellants' arguments 
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based on an alleged factual foundation that the UTERO officials acted outside Tribal 
lands or beyond the scope of their authority must be rejected. 
2. Ultra Vires 
i. Whether the Individual Defendants Acted Ultra Vires of 
the UTERO Ordinance Is a Legal Question that No Court 
Has Ruled On, Not a Fact 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' ultra vires argument rests on the assumption that it has 
already been determined that the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires of the UTERO 
Ordinance. While they do not say so expressly, it appears that Plaintiffs-Appellants are 
again are relying on the incorrect assumption that their claim that the Individual 
Defendants acted ultra vires must be accepted as true for purposes of the Motion to 
Dismiss. However, like the determination of whether the Individual Defendants 
exceeded the scope of the Tribe's jurisdiction, the question of whether the Individual 
Defendants acted ultra vires of the UTERO Ordinance is a legal question that no court 
has ruled on. Since the Plaintiffs-Appellants' ultra vires argument is based on this faulty 
presumption, it must fail. 
ii. Only the Ute Tribal Court May Determine if the 
Individual Defendants Acted Ultra Vires of the UTERO 
Ordinance. 
As the district court found, "[ w ]hether the UTERO officials exceeded the scope of 
authority given to them by the UTERO Ordinance necessarily requires examining and 
interpreting the UTERO Ordinance. Interpreting tribal laws is outside the scope of a state 
district court's general jurisdiction." (R. 1787-88.) The district court cited U.S. Supreme 
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Court precedent that "'[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal court also infringes 
upon tribal law-making authority, because the tribal courts are best qualified to interpret 
and apply tribal law." (R. 1788 (citing Iowa Mutual, 107 S. Ct. at 977)). 
iii. The Amended Complaint Does Not Contain Any Alleged 
Facts that Support Plaintiffs-Appellants' Ultra Vires 
Argument. 
The assertion that the Individual Defendants acted ultra vires means that they 
allegedly acted beyond the authority granted to them by the UTERO Ordinance. Yet the 
Amended Complaint does not specify what actions allegedly taken by the Individual 
Defendants violated the UTERO Ordinance, nor identifies a single provision of the 
UTERO Ordinance that the Individual Defendants exceeded. Thus, once again, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants assert legal arguments that have no factual basis in their Amended 
Complaint and therefore may not stand. 
3. The Tribe Is a Necessary and Indispensable Party. 
In sum, Plaintiffs-Appellants' effort to show that the Tribe is not a necessary or 
indispensable party is: (1) premised on the existence oflegal conclusions that have never 
been made by any court, (2) based on factors - the scope of the Tribe's authority and the 
ultra vires determination - that are within the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribal Court, not the 
Utah state court, and (3) not supported by the facts· alleged in the Amended Complaint. 
For these reasons, not only do the Plaintiffs-Appellants' new arguments on this 
point fail, but they in fact reinforce the district court's finding that the Tribe is a 
necessary and indispensable party, because the Tribe would be severely prejudiced if 
18 
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decisions about the scope of its jurisdiction and the application of its ordinances were 
decided without it being a party to the case. 
4. Plaintiffs-Appellants Consented to the Jurisdiction of the Ute 
Tribal Court for the Matters Raised in the Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that the district court erred when it found that 
Plaintiffs-Appellants have a remedy in Tribal Court or the tribal administrative process: 
"In essence the trial court determined it was appropriate that Plaintiffs subject themselves 
to tribal regulatory control to address business activities the situs of which is exclusively 
interstate." (Brief of PL-App. at 26.) As discussed supra, however, the Amended 
Complaint does not contain a single allegation that the Tribe, the UTERO, or the 
Individual Defendants exercised any authority off of the Reservation or sought to 
interfere with Plaintiffs-Appellants' off-Reservation business activities. As the district 
court found, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint establish at most that the 
UTERO and the Individual Defendants exercised their authority to restrict the Plaintiffs-
Appellants' on-Reservation business activities for failure to comply with the UTERO 
Ordinance. (R. 1778.) 
In the proceedings below, the Individual Defendants noted that Plaintiffs-
Appellants consented to the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribal Court for resolving UTERO-
related matters when they executed the documents necessary to obtain Ute Tribal 
business licenses, Ute Tribal access permits, and Ute certification. (R. 1077 .) While 
Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that they signed these documents under "duress" (Brief of PL-
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App. at 11 ), what they are calling "duress" was simply the insistence by the UTERO 
officials that Plaintiffs-Appellants comply with the UTERO Ordinance if they wished to 
continue providing goods and services to companies performing work on Tribal lands. 
II. A BALANCING OF THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND THE 
TRIBE IS NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE THE TRIBE IS NOT 
ATTEMPTING TO REGULATE OFF-RESERVATION BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the district court should have balanced the equities 
in this case, claiming that the State's interests outweigh the Tribe's interests in regulating 
business activity occurring off of the Reservation in the State of Utah. (Brief of PL-App. 
28-30.) This argument fails because, as discussed supra, the Amended Complaint fails to 
allege a single business activity that the Tribe or the Individual Defendants sought to 
regulate on non-Tribal land. Plaintiffs-Appellants' reference to Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and its progeny is inapposite, because in that line of cases, 
the U.S. Supreme Court limited the authority of tribes over non-Indians on non-Indian 
land. In the present case, however, the only action the Individual Defendants took was to 
exercise authority over companies engaged in business activities on Tribal lands. There 
is not a single case that challenges or begins to limit the authority of a tribe to set the 
terms and conditions upon which a party may use its lands, and there are no court cases 
that call for balancing of equities in such a situation. Therefore, the district court did not 
need to engage in a balancing of equities in this case. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE 
TRIBE'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS THE SUIT. 
The district court properly dismissed all claims against the Individual Defendants 
on the basis that sovereign immunity bars the suit. (R. 1787.) On appeal, Plaintiffs-
Appellants assert that the Tribe's sovereign immunity does not extend to the Individual 
Defendants, because the Individual Defendants were allegedly acting ultra vires and 
beyond the scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. These 
arguments are unavailing. 2 
A. The Determination of Whether the Individual Defendants Acted Ultra 
Vires Is Outside the Jurisdiction of the Utah State Courts. 
The Appeal Brief repeatedly argues that the Individual Defendants acted ultra 
vires and therefore are not covered by tribal sovereign immunity. (Brief of PL-App. at 
16, 18, 19-28, 45.) This is a bald accusation; as noted supra, Plaintiffs-Appellants have 
not identified a single provision of the UTERO Ordinance that they believe the Individual 
Defendants exceeded or violated. Absent such alleged facts in their Amended Complaint, 
this argument must fail. Further, Plaintiffs-Appellants mistakenly argue that the ultra 
vires nature of the Individual Defendants' actions is a fact that must be assumed to be 
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. As discussed supra, this is a question of law 
that no court has ruled on, and because it requires an interpretation of tribal law (i.e., the 
UTERO Ordinance), this question is outside the jurisdiction of the Utah state courts. (R. 
2 Plaintiffs-Appellants consistently refer to the Individual Defendants using their official 
titles, such as Commissioner or Director, supporting the argument that they are acting as 
agents of the Tribe and thus entitled to protection under the Tribe's immunity. 
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1787-88.) See also Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1995), superseded 
by statute on other grounds by Peters v. Noonan, 871 F. Supp. 2d 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)) ("there is 
no state or federal interest served by providing a forum other than the tribal court for the 
resolution of internal tribal disputes, and as a matter of federal law, the Pennhurst rule 
bars the state and federal courts from applying the [ Ex Parle] Young doctrine to a tribal 
law claim."). 
B. The Amended Complaint Does Not State with Specificity What the 
Individual Defendants Allegedly Did that Is Beyond the Scope of the 
Authority the Tribe Is Capable of Conferring on Them; the Tribe Is 
the Real Party in Interest with Respect to Questions of Its Ability to 
Bestow Authority on Tribal Officials. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that the Tribe's sovereign immunity does not extend to ~ 
the Individual Defendants because the Individual Defendants exceeded the scope of the 
authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on them. (Brief of PL-App. at 18, 21-22, 
45-4 7.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it is insufficiently pied, and second, 
the Tribe is the real party in interest with respect to questions of what authority the Tribe 
is capable of bestowing on its officials, but as explained supra, the Tribe is a necessary 
and indispensable party that cannot be joined in this action. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to follow the standard established by the cases cited in 
their Appeal Brief, which hold that in order to sustain a claim for damages against a tribal 
official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff cannot merely allege that the tribal 
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official violated state or federal law, but rather must plead specific facts to prove that the 
official acted without any colorable claim of authority. 
Although the plaintiff alleges that some of the defendants' activities were 
"illegal" or "unlawful" (see, e.g., Complaint, Count Three, ilil 45-46.), such 
allegations are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish that the defendants 
acted outside the scope of their authority. In Basset v. Mashantucket 
Pequot Museum and Research Center Inc., supra, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 281, 
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that "ti 
is insufficient for the [plaintiff] merely to allege that [the defendants] 
violated state and federal law in order to state a claim that [the defendants] 
acted beyond the scope of their authority; it would be tantamount to 
eliminating tribal immunity from damages actions because a plaintiff must 
always allege a wrong in order to state a claim for relief. Rather, the Court 
finds that to state a claim for damages against [the defendants], the 
plaintiffs would have to allege and prove that [the defendants] acted 
'without any colorable claim of authority,' apart from whether they acted in 
violation of federal or state law." 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Dev. Co., LLC v. Rosow, No. X03CV034000160S, 2005 
WL 1273260, at* 12 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2005) (emphasis added). The Amended 
Complaint simply asserts that the Individual Defendants violated state law; it does not 
state with specificity what the Individual Defendants allegedly did that is beyond the 
scope of the authority the Tribe is capable of conferring on them, nor argue that the 
Individual Defendants acted without any colorable claim of authority. As noted above, 
the district court found that the "minimal factual allegations" in the Amended Complaint 
"fail to support the various claims the Plaintiffs set forth." (R. 1778.) 
In the Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants somewhat refine their position, and as 
discussed supra, appear to argue that the Individual Defendants' actions exceeded the 
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing because those actions 
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allegedly occurred off of tribal land. However, as explained supra, the only actions by 
the Individual Defendants that allegedly harmed Plaintiffs-Appellants were taken on 
Tribal land - namely, revocation of Rocks Off, Inc. 's business license and issuance of the 
March 20 Letter.3 The Individual Defendants had, at a bare minimum, a colorable claim 
of authority to perform these actions, as required by the Basset I Trump test; the district 
court expressly recognized the Tribe's interest in regulating business activity on tribal 
lands. (R. 1770.) 
To the extent that Plaintiffs-Appellants are asking this Court to determine the 
scope of the authority that the Tribe is capable of bestowing on its officers, then, as 
recognized by the district court and discussed further supra, the Tribe is the real party in 
interest in such a determination, and the Ute Tribal Court has initial jurisdiction over this 
question.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit precedent establishes that when a 
3 At the very end of the Facts Pleaded in Amended Complaint section of the Appeal 
Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants claim that "[ a ]11 acts and occurrences complained of in the 
Amended Complaint occurred on fee land outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under 
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). R. 562." (Brief of PL-App. at 14.) This statement 
is not an accurate representation of what is contained in the Amended Complaint. A 
comparison of the "Facts" in the Appeal Brief and the comparable allegations in the 
Amended Complaint shows that in the latter, the allegations rarely if ever allege that the 
actions occurred off of Ute Tribal lands, and never· with the specificity required by the 
principles set out in Trump. 
4 The district court stated that "[t]he Plaintiffs request the Court issue a declaratory order 
limiting the Tribe, UTERO, and UTERO officials from regulating private business 
activities of non-Indians outside of the tribal land. This type of relief directly involves 
the Tribe, not the individual Defendants personally." (R. 1787.) The district court 
further held that "a determination about whether the Tribe and its officials may issue 
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tribe is the real party in interest, the tribe's sovereign immunity extends to tribal officials. 
See Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (tribe's sovereign 
immunity extends to tribal official when tribe "is the real, substantial party in interest"); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) ("[T]he general 
rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the 
decree would operate against the latter") ( citation omitted); see also Maxwell v. Cty. of 
San Diego, 708 F.3d. 1075, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (sovereign immunity did not bar suit 
against the tribal employees because the tribe was not the real party in interest when 
tribal employees allegedly performed grossly negligent acts off-Reservation pursuant to a 
contract with a non-tribal entity). As such, the Tribe's sovereign immunity applies to the 
Individual Defendants with respect to questions about the scope of authority that the 
Tribe may confer on its officials. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE TORT 
CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
FACTS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
In the Ruling and Order dated March 28, 2016, addressing the motion to dismiss 
filed by the Newfield Defendants, the district court stated that, in a separate ruling, it had 
found that the "Ute Tribe was a necessary and indispensable party to this action. 
However, the Ute Tribe is immune from suit." (R.· 1776.) The district court adopted that 
decision in the Ruling and Order and stated that, while "that decision makes the 
additional arguments moot, the Court will address the additional arguments as an 
directives relating to oil companies' business activities, such as the directive alleged to 
have been issued in this case, is a critical interest of the Tribe." (R. 1768.) 
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alternative basis to dismiss the Amended Verified Complaint." (Id.) The district court 
then went on to conclude that the minimal factual allegations in the Amended Complaint 
"failed to support the various claims the Plaintiffs set forth. The facts do not support a 
finding that Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the mind to harm 
the Plaintiffs' business." (R. 1778-79.) Although in this Ruling the district court was 
addressing the motion to dismiss filed by the Newfield Defendants, as an alternative basis 
to affirm the court's judgment in favor of the Individual Defendants and the Company 
Defendants, this Court may properly rely on the independent bases for dismissal for 
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b )( 6) cited by the district court. See State v. 
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that an appellate court may 
affirm on grounds not urged below if the ground or theory "is apparent on the record") 
( citation omitted). 
A. Tortious Interference with Economic Relations 
The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Individual Defendants 
and the Company Defendants for tortious interference with economic relations. In 
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, iJ 70,345 P.3d 553, 565, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that, to state a claim for tortious interference with economic relations, the plaintiff 
must allege that the defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiffs existing or potential 
economic relations, by improper means, and that the actions caused injury to the plaintiff. 
"Improper means are present 'where the means used to interfere with a party's economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized 
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common-law rules."' St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d at 201 
( citation omitted). 
Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that the improper means used by the Individual 
Defendants was the March 20 Letter. Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that "this directive is 
not limited to use of the Plaintiffs on Ute Tribal land but is rather a blanket boycott/ 
blacklist of Plaintiffs regardless of the situs of the business activity." (Brief of PL-App. 
at 32.) Again, Plaintiffs-Appellants' characterization of the March 20 Letter is 
inaccurate. The Letter states only that the oil and gas companies to whom the Letter was 
directed were not authorized to use Plaintiffs-Appellants' businesses in work conducted 
on Tribal lands; the Letter does not mention off-Reservation business activities at all. 
Further, the March 20 Letter was issued pursuant to the formal procedures set out in the 
UTERO Ordinance. Accordingly, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants 
failed to identify any improper means to support a claim for tortious interference with 
economic relations. Also, as noted by the Newfield Defendants, Plaintiffs-Appellants are 
required to allege interference with an existing contract between Plaintiffs and a third 
party. The Amended Complaint contains no such allegation. (See Newfield Brief at 
Section V.A.5.) The claim for tortious interference was properly dismissed. 
B. Extortion 
In the Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to support their claim for extortion, 
which is not recognized under Utah law. On this point, and pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Individual Defendants and the Company 
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Defendants incorporate by reference the general legal arguments advanced by the 
Newfield Defendants regarding extortion. (See Newfield Brief at Section V.A. l .a.) For 
the reasons set forth in the legal authorities cited by the Newfield Defendants, the 
Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants assert that there is no recognized 
private claim for extortion under Utah law. 
Even if Utah did recognize a claim for extortion, however, the facts alleged in the 
Amended Complaint are inadequate to state a claim. The Amended Complaint alleges 
that "Commissioner Cesspooch attempted to extort money from Ryan in the IF A parking 
lot saying that he 'sure needed a good riding horse."' (R. 557.) The Amended Complaint 
goes on to allege, however, that "Ryan refused to give Commissioner Cesspooch any 
money at that time." (R. 558.) Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to identify any 
property of Plaintiffs that any of the Individual Defendants or the Company Defendants 
allegedly obtained by extortion. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the 
claim for extortion. (R. 1780.) 
C. Blacklisting 
Likewise, pursuant to Rule 24(i), the Individual Defendants and the Company 
Defendants incorporate by reference the general arguments made by the Newfield 
Defendants regarding the nonexistence of a private cause of action for blacklisting under 
Utah law. (See Newfield Brief at Section V.A.2.a-b.) 
Even if such a claim existed under Utah law, however, Plaintiffs have failed to 
allege any facts meeting the elements of the claim. There are no facts alleged in the 
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Amended Complaint that any of the Individual Defendants or the Company Defendants 
exchanged blacklists referring to Plaintiffs. See Utah Const., art. XVI, section 4 ("The 
exchange of black lists by railroad companies, or other corporations, associations or 
persons is prohibited."). Instead, the sole allegation is that Director Wopsock sent a letter 
(i.e., the March 20 Letter) to certain oil and gas companies advising that Plaintiffs-
Appellants were not authorized to conduct business on Tribal land and that other 
companies "doing work on the Reservation" were not authorized to use Plaintiffs-
Appellants' services on tribal land. (R. 53.) The district court properly dismissed the 
claim for blacklisting. 
D. Antitrust 
The district court also properly dismissed the claim for antitrust violations for 
· failure to state a claim. The Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants join in 
and incorporate by reference the Newfield Defendants' general legal arguments regarding 
this point. (See Newfield Brief at Section V.A.3.a.) The key element that Plaintiffs-
Appellants must allege is that there was a meeting of the minds on a common object or 
course of action. "Section I of the Sherman Act requires that there be a 'contract, 
combination ... or conspiracy' between the manufacturer and other distributors in order 
to establish a violation." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1). Again, the core allegation of the Amended Complaint 
focuses on the March 20 Letter from UTERO Director Wopsock. The issuance of the 
Letter does not reflect a contract or combination between any of the parties in this case. 
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Rather, the Letter is simply a notification to other contractors performing work on Tribal 
lands that they are not authorized to do such work using Plaintiffs-Appellants' services. 
As the district court correctly recognized, all "that is alleged is [that] UTERO informed 
Newfield that [] Rocks Off was no longer allowed to conduct business on tribal land, and 
Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs explaining that Newfield was not going to 
do business with Plaintiffs due to the UTERO notice." (R. 1780.) The district court 
properly dismissed the antitrust claim. (R. 1781.) 
E. Civil Conspiracy 
Finally, the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 
for civil conspiracy. A claim for civil conspiracy requires "(I) a combination of two or 
more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object 
or course of action, ( 4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and ( 5) damages as a proximate 
result thereof." Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, ,r 13, 275 P.3d 1024, 1029 
· (citation omitted). For the same reasons as set forth above, Plaintiffs-Appellants fail to 
allege a claim for conspiracy. There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint 
reflecting a combination of two or more persons, with a meeting of the minds on an 
object or course of action, using one or more unlawful, overt acts that resulted in 
damages to Plaintiffs-Appellants. The March 20 Letter advising oil and gas companies 
that they are not authorized to use Plaintiffs-Appellants' services in work on Tribal land 
does not amount to a combination with any other person or entity to commit an 
"unlawful" and "overt" act to damage Plaintiffs. Further, the Amended Complaint fails 
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to identify any underlying tort that would support a claim for civil conspiracy. 
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claim for civil conspiracy for 
failure to state a claim. 
V. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED WITH RESPECT TO THE 
COMPANY DEFENDANTS. 
The district court observed that "'[t]o support a claim for relief, a plaintiff 'must 
have alleged sufficient facts ... to satisfy each element of a claim."' (R. 1785 ( quoting 
Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 296 P.3d 760 (Utah App. Ct. 2013)).) The district court 
concluded that, in regard to the claims alleged against the Company Defendants, the 
Amended Complaint "does not assert any facts supporting the claims made against these 
two corporate Defendants." (R. 1785.) The court found that the Amended Complaint 
"only alleges facts regarding the individual Defendants' actions as individuals and as 
government officials of the Tribe. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted against these two corporate Defendants." (Id.) 
In their Appeal Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants do not challenge the legal principle 
upon which the district court based its holding but instead seek to rebut this finding by 
quoting various references to the Company Defendants in the Amended Complaint. 
However, a review of those quotations reinforces the district court's findings; not a single 
one sets out facts that allege an action by either or both of the Company Defendants. 
They only allege actions by their owners (see, e.g., "That LaRose, as [ an] owner of 
Larose Construction ... conspired to receive an economic interest in a competing gravel 
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pit ... " and "Cesspooch, LaRose and Director Wopsock conspired to .... "). (Brief of 
PL-App. at 43-44.) The only action the Company Defendants are alleged to have taken is 
to "participate in the conspiracy" (id. at 44) - a conclusionary statement that clearly 
failed to satisfy any, much less each, element of the claims made against the Company 
Defendants. This Court should therefore should uphold the district court's dismissal of 
the Amended Complaint against the Company Defendants under Rule 12(b )( 6). 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE A 
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING. 
The Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants hereby join in the 
arguments raised in Section V.C of the Newfield Defendants' brief regarding the district 
court's disposition of Plaintiffs-Appellants' motion for leave to file a supplemental 
pleading. For the reasons set forth by the Newfield Defendants, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
district court's order denying the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of all causes of action against the 
Individual Defendants and the Company Defendants. 
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• 
March 20, 2013 
To all Oil & Gas Companies: 
Ute Indian Tribe 
UTERO Commission 
P.O. Box 190 
Fort Duchesne, UT 84026 
Phone: (435) 725-4982 
Please be advised that on March 15, 2013, the Tribal Energy and Minerals Department revoked 
the access pemiits for the following businesses and individuals: 
o J. Brothers Trucking & Excavation, .LLC - Justin Justice, Benjamin Justice and 
Thomas Justice 
o Rocks Off, Inc - Ryan Harvey 
As a result, the UTERO Commission revoked the UTERO License for these businesses and 
individuals for failure to comply with the UTERO Ordinance, Ord. No. 10-002 (July 27, 2010). 
As a result of such action, these businesses and individuals are no longer authorized to perform 
work on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Any use of these businesses and individuals by an 
employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of this Notice may result in the assessment 
of penalties and/or sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the law. 
If you should have any questions on the UTERO Commission decision please feel free to contact 
the UTERO Deparbnent at (435) 725-7086 . 
cc: Business Committee (6) 
Energy & Minerals Dept. 
UTBC General Counsel 
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